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at creating strong states via occupation, it
should be thinking about fall-back positions if it fails at creating democracy
overseas.
The United States needs to get better at
state building. The U.S. military cannot
avoid bearing much of the implied burden, like it or not. Read State Building
for a thoughtful introduction to the
challenges involved.
MARSHALL HOYLER

Naval War College

Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the
CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2004. 695pp. $29.95

The events of 9/11 led many in the
United States to wonder what had actually led up to that fateful day. Who was
to blame? How could the United States,
with its multibillion-dollar intelligence
and defense budgets, have allowed such
a thing to happen? In Ghost Wars, Steve
Coll provides a useful, if overly long,
chronology and analysis of pivotal
events, missteps, indecision, apathy,
and ultimately tragedy up to the day before the attacks.
Coll, who served as the managing editor
for the Washington Post until 2004, was
the paper’s South Asia bureau chief
from 1989 to 1992. He won a Pulitzer
Prize in 1990 for his reporting on South
Asia, and he has been a keen observer of
events in the region. He begins his story
with the burning of the U.S. embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 1979
and traces the long road of events to 11
September. It was shortly after the riots
in Islamabad that the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, in December 1979.
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As he weaves his narrative, Coll meticulously documents every player and
agenda in this drama. Coll divides the
book into three parts. In the first he
discusses the Soviet occupation from
December 1979 to February 1989. It is
here that we are introduced to mujahedeen leaders Ahmed Shah Massoud,
Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
and Osama Bin Laden. One also becomes acquainted with key players in
the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI-D) and in the Saudi
monarchy who played key roles in
bankrolling the resistance. The author
also provides valuable insights into the
U.S. policy-making process. During this
period, the United States was consumed
with battling the Soviet occupation, and
most policy makers did not give serious
thought to the repercussions of the
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate’s
growing control over aid distribution or
the increasing anti-American attitudes of
such rebel commanders as Hekmatyar.
Coll continues to trace events in Afghanistan after the Soviet pullout in
1989. Once the Soviets were gone, interest in a stable Afghanistan rapidly
waned as other crises in the immediate
post–Cold War era monopolized U.S.
attention. As a result, Afghanistan fell
into chaos as warlords fought each other
for control of Kabul. The lack of American involvement after the Soviets withdrew left Pakistan as the primary force to
manage the post-Soviet environment.
The author captures the rivalries within
Afghanistan, the manipulation of events
by the Pakistani government, and the
apathy of U.S. policy makers throughout
this period.
One of the major strengths of Ghost
Wars is how it skillfully captures the interagency debates within the U.S.
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government on Afghanistan—specifically, the discussion on various debates
among the CIA, the State Department,
and the National Security Council—
which were wide-ranging and often
contentious. After reading these accounts one is left with the distinct
impression that there was no overarching policy or strategy to attack
al-Qa‘ida. Instead, U.S. government
policy comes across as ad hoc, driven
by current contingencies or spurious
information about Osama Bin Laden’s
whereabouts.
In the final section, Coll documents the
often frantic and uncoordinated interagency campaign to find Bin Laden.
Despite George Tenet’s declaration in
December 1998 that the CIA was at war
with al-Qa‘ida, the U.S. government as
a whole never fully came to grips with
the threat posed by terrorism. For many
in Washington, terrorism represented
only one threat among many facing the
United States in the post–Cold War era.
Although terrorism did elicit concern
among top U.S. policy makers, it rarely
moved into a sustained, interagency
strategy to combat the threat.
Prospective readers of this book should
be aware that it is lengthy and requires
close attention. Characters and events
discussed in part 1 are revisited. Coll
helps the reader along with a list of
principal characters at the front of the
book. Despite its length, however,
Ghost Wars will provide valuable insights for anyone working within the
interagency process, as well as scholars
and regional observers interested in
how the United States got Afghanistan
and Bin Laden so tragically wrong.
AMER LATIF

Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Dahlgren, Virginia
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Maurer, John H., ed. Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in Honor
of Michael I. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
164pp. $79.95

One of three volumes of essays (two focus on different aspects of strategy) published in Handel’s memory, this work is
based on a conference held in Newport,
Rhode Island. It offers four scholarly papers on Churchill’s assessment of the
German naval challenge before the First
World War, Pacific security and the limits of British power between the wars,
Churchill and the German threat in the
late 1930s, and Churchill’s views of technology. Each assesses a different aspect
of Churchill’s changing role.
Editor Maurer focuses on the early
1900s’ battleship naval race with Germany. Brought in as First Lord of the
Admiralty after the Agadir crisis of
1911, Winston Churchill is seen here as
fully aware of the danger to Britain if its
fleet were to be seriously disabled. The
Admiralty tried to maintain at least a 60
percent advantage in dreadnought construction against Germany. Churchill
sought to impress the Germans with the
futility of trying to catch up with, let
alone outbuild, Britain. Cognizant of
the costs of this race, however, in 1913
he proposed a naval “holiday” to
stretch out the construction of projected new ships over more time, hoping to reduce the pace. Maurer reviews
the important domestic political battles
that underlay this naval arms race.
Christopher Bell, who teaches history at
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, assesses Churchill’s concern
over the growing threat posed by Japan
in the interwar years. He notes a 1928
Churchill comment that “of all the wars
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